St. Mary's Law Journal
Volume 51

Number 3

Article 1

6-2020

The Army’s G-RAP Fiasco: How the Lives and Careers of
Hundreds of Innocent Soldiers Were Destroyed
Jeffrey F. Addicott
St. Mary's University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal
Part of the Government Contracts Commons, Legal Remedies Commons, and the Military, War, and
Peace Commons

Recommended Citation
Jeffrey F. Addicott, The Army’s G-RAP Fiasco: How the Lives and Careers of Hundreds of Innocent
Soldiers Were Destroyed, 51 ST. MARY'S L.J. 549 (2020).
Available at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol51/iss3/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the St. Mary's Law Journals at Digital Commons at St.
Mary's University. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. Mary's Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons at St. Mary's University. For more information, please contact sfowler@stmarytx.edu.

Addicott: The Army’s G-RAP Fiasco

ARTICLE
THE ARMY’S G-RAP FIASCO:
HOW THE LIVES AND CAREERS
OF HUNDREDS OF INNOCENT SOLDIERS
WERE DESTROYED
JEFFREY F. ADDICOTT*
“We believe those [National Guardsmen who worked in the G-RAP]
still being investigated are unfairly being targeted and that the result of the investigation
has ruined lives, careers, marriages, and credit; indeed, some have opted for suicide
to end the relentless harassment.”1
—Enlisted Association of the National Guard of the United States

* Professor of Law and Director, Warrior Defense Project, St. Mary’s University School of Law.
B.A. (with honors in Government & Politics), University of Maryland (1976); J.D., University of
Alabama School of Law (1979); LL.M. (Military Law), The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and
School; LL.M. (International Law) (1992), and S.J.D. (International Law) (1994), University of Virginia
School of Law. This article was prepared under the auspices of the Warrior Defense Project (WDP)
located at St. Mary’s University School of Law, San Antonio, Texas. Dr. Addicott is a retired Army
Lieutenant Colonel, who served in senior legal positions throughout the world as a Judge Advocate, and
now specializes in National Security law. The WDP’s mission includes the study of legal issues that
impact military readiness as well as providing pro bono representation to military personnel wrongfully
accused of misconduct in the performance of their duties. The author wishes to acknowledge with
special thanks the superb efforts of research assistants Nathaniel Hawkins, Cody Beitel, and Katherine
Salinas, who supported this article with outstanding research, drafting, and editing.
1. Open Letter from the Enlisted Association of the National Guard of the United States to
Lindsey Graham, U.S. Senator, and Patrick Leahy, U.S. Senator (June 1, 2017), https://eangus.org/wpcontent/uploads/sites/6/2017/06/EANGUS_G-RAP_Letter_Senate.pdf [https://perma.cc/UK7Y
-EHA2].
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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the untoward realities of any criminal justice system—either in terms
of investigations or prosecutions—is that mistakes and errors sometimes
occur, causing great harm to the innocent. While substantive and procedural
safeguards have evolved over time and experience to prevent or rectify these
injustices ab initio, sometimes there emerges a systemic breakdown of such
magnitude that it simply overwhelms even the most sacred of our Anglo-Saxon
values—that a person is innocent until proven guilty.
Such is the case with what was the largest criminal investigation in the
history of the Army’s Criminal Investigation Command, Criminal
Investigation Division, more commonly known as the “CID.” Code-named
“Task Force Raptor,” the Army-wide criminal probe saw over 200 CID agents
“investigate” tens of thousands of Army National Guard and Army Reserve
personnel ostensibly to root out individuals thought to have engaged in whitecollar styled crimes as participants in the legally flawed and now defunct Army
National Guard Recruiting Assistance Program (G-RAP) and/or the Army
Reserve Recruiting Assistance Program (AR-RAP). Both programs were
conceived out of a need to bolster troop strength due to personnel shortages
that occurred in the Global War on Terror (GWOT).2
2. The term “Global War on Terror” (also called the “War on Terror”) has been used both as
a metaphor to describe a general conflict against all radical Islamic international terrorist groups, and
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Although the vast majority of those targeted were innocent of any
wrongdoing whatsoever, many were nonetheless branded as suspected
criminals and “titled” as such in CID Reports of Investigation (ROI) for crimes
that they did not commit. And those were the fortunate. Some of the innocent
soldiers were also prosecuted in U.S. federal criminal courts and sentenced to
prison terms, while others were subjected to punishment through criminal and
administrative processes in the military’s justice system.
The purpose of this article is three-fold. First, this article seeks to explore
the legal and policy ramifications of the CID’s multi-year criminal
investigation, which targeted vast numbers of innocent Army National Guard
and Army Reserve personnel for alleged criminality as contract employees in
the G-RAP or AR-RAP.
Second, this article aims to highlight the CID’s longstanding practice—
referred to as “titling”—of refusing to delete from their system of records
those individuals that are subsequently cleared of any wrongdoing by their
commands. This highly dubious administrative practice was particularly
devastating to the hundreds of innocent and fully-exonerated participants in
the G-RAP and AR-RAP in terms of promotions, security clearances, and job
selection both in the military and civilian world.
Finally, this article will call direct attention to the need for congressional
action to amend the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act (WSLA)3 so that
the current suspension of the statute of limitations does not apply to those
soldiers who participated in the G-RAP and AR-RAP. Not only does the
current version of the WSLA (as amended by the Wartime Enforcement of

to describe the combat operations against al-Qaeda and the Taliban in 2001 and Saddam Hussein in
2003. The more precise use of the term is to describe the ongoing international armed conflict between
the United States of America and the “Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces.” Military Commissions
Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, 10 U.S.C. § 948 (2006). One of the clearest
indications of the congressional authorization for war and for the use of the law of war, the MCA lists
“unlawful enemy combatants” as:
(i) a person who has engaged in hostilities or who has purposefully and materially supported
hostilities against the United States or its co-belligerents who is not a lawful enemy combatant
(including a person who is part of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces); or
(ii) a person who, before, on, or after the date of the enactment of the Military Commissions Act
of 2006, has been determined to be an unlawful enemy combatant by a Combatant Status Review
Tribunal or another competent tribunal established under the authority of the President or the
Secretary of Defense.
Id. § 948(a).
3. Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3287 (1948).
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Fraud Act) violate the long-recognized principle of repose, it irresponsibly
blurs the line between civilian contractors and military contractors and casts
too broad a net over what reasonably constitutes “wartime” activities.
II. THE G-RAP
As of this writing, America is still engaged in the longest war in its
illustrious history.4 The GWOT is a multi-dimensional conflict that began
on September 11, 2001, when nineteen members of the radical Islamic alQaeda network attacked the United States by means of hijacked airplanes.5
The terror network al-Qaeda was “headquartered” in Afghanistan and
openly operated under the protection of the Taliban government. Since that
time, the GWOT has been fought on numerous overseas battlefields by
American ground troops from the active-duty military augmented by forces
from the Army National Guard and Army Reserve. While the GWOT most
certainly serves as a reminder of the importance of the Army National
Guard6 and Army Reserve as essential components to maintaining the
nation’s military readiness, both the Army National Guard and Army
Reserve have periodically struggled to achieve proper force levels—even in
“peace time”7 environments.
While the GWOT began with the al-Qaeda terror attacks, the
United States and its allies soon expanded the conflict by targeting the rogue
regime of Saddam Hussein in 2003.8 For better or worse, Iraq quickly

4. See William J. Astore, The Longest War in American History Has No End in Sight, NATION
(Feb. 28, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/the-longest-war-in-american-history-has-no-endin-sight/ [https://perma.cc/G4KA-XE7U] (indicating the war in Afghanistan is now in its sixteenth
year which makes it the longest foreign war in our history); Thomas Nagorski, Editor’s Notebook: Afghan
War Now Country’s Longest, ABC NEWS (June 7, 2010, 3:00 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/
Politics/afghan-war-now-longest-war-us-history/story?id=10849303
[https://perma.cc/Q9RYT3AE] (“And today ‘The Other War’ has gained a fresh and dubious distinction: it is the longest war
in our nation’s history, surpassing the conflict in Vietnam.”).
5. See generally JEFFREY F. ADDICOTT, RADICAL ISLAM WHY? (2016) (providing a general
background discussion of the concept of radical Islam).
6. See Our History, ARMY NAT’L GUARD, https://www.nationalguard.com/legacy
[https://perma.cc/Q6UP-CF4V] (“National Guard Soldiers serve both community and country. Our
versatility enables us to respond to domestic emergencies, overseas combat missions, counterdrug
efforts, reconstruction missions and more.”).
7. John Warner et al., The Military Recruiting Productivity Slowdown: The Roles of Resources, Opportunity
Cost and the Tastes of Youth, 14 DEFENCE & PEACE ECON. 329, 333 (2003).
8. Rowan Scarborough, Numbers Show National Guard Bonus Scandal Not Living Up to the Hype,
WASH. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2016), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/feb/11/nationalguard-fraud-claims-taint-recruiting-assis/ [https://perma.cc/DU9B-5FCB].
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became part of the GWOT. Among other issues of concern in providing
stability to the new interim Iraqi government, the need for additional
American ground troops weighed heavily as a key ingredient for success.
Back home, however, the active-duty Army was short on personnel, and by
2005, over 100,000 Army National Guard soldiers were already on federal
active duty.9 Although Congress sets troop authorizations under its
Article I powers,10 no politician seemed serious about calling for a
mandatory national draft of young men to meet the increased needs.
Instead, military planners turned to the state’s Army National Guard,
looking for more volunteers to “federalize.”11 In the context of this
discussion, in July 2005, the Army National Guard counted roughly 330,000
soldiers—20,000 short of Congress’s authorization.12 Due to the shortages,
novel steps were taken to bolster recruitment, including the adoption of a
highly-irregular recruiting assistance scheme—the G-RAP.13
A. DOCUPAK
In 2005, the Army awarded Document and Packaging Brokers, Inc.
(DOCUPAK)—a private civilian corporation operating out of Birmingham,
Alabama—an extremely lucrative government contract to administer GRAP.14 The mission of G-RAP was simple. “[G-RAP and later AR-RAP]

9. NAT’L GUARD ASS’N OF THE U.S., THE G-RAP PROGRAM: THE INVESTIGATIONS AND
AN INJECTION OF REALITY 1, http://www.defendourprotectors.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/GRAP-Program-The-Investigations-and-an-Injection-of-Reality.pdf [https://perma.cc/ETR3-DNRJ]
[hereinafter NGA G-RAP REPORT].
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
11. Scarborough, supra note 8.
12. Bob Haskell, Army Guard Reaches 350,000-Member Goal Ahead of Schedule, NAT’L GUARD
(Apr. 23, 2007), https://www.nationalguard.mil/News/Article-View/Article/572952/army-guardreaches-350000-member-goal-ahead-of-schedule/ [https://perma.cc/TG6X-2C6P].
13. See NGA G-RAP REPORT, supra note 9, at 1 (explaining when Hurricane Katrina hit the
Gulf Coast of the United States in August of 2005, an additional 50,000 National Guard were needed
for this domestic disaster).
14. See United States v. Osborne, 886 F.3d 604, 606 (6th Cir. 2018) (explaining
DOCUPAK’s role in the G-RAP program).
Although the official website for G-RAP
(www.guardrecruitingassistant.com) cannot be found, the Defend Our Protectors website
has compiled AR-RAP and G-RAP marketing and other informational materials which have
been cited throughout. Resources, DEFEND OUR PROTECTORS, http://www.defendourprotectors.com
/resources/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2020). See also Memorandum from the Subcomm. on Fin. and
Contracting Oversight Majority Staff, to Members of the Subcomm. on Fin. and Contracting Oversight
(Feb. 13, 2014), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Army%20Recruiting%20Memo%20
for%20Members%20and%20Staff%20Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/GC7R-TVQV] [hereinafter
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was designed to be a recruitment tool to supplement the recruiting activities of
full-time [Army] recruiters during a time of increased demand for soldiers
in a depressed recruiting market . . . [by leveraging] soldiers to identify,
mentor, and sponsor potential candidates for enlistment.”15
Any National Guard soldier, except an Army National Guard soldier who
was a Recruiter,16 could quickly become qualified to work in G-RAP by
completing a rather simplistic online DOCUPAK course of instruction.
Once this short online session was done, the soldier would be officially
designated as a DOCUPAK “recruiting assistant” (RA).17 Accordingly,
RA’s were compensated directly through DOCUPAK based on fulfilling
certain ill-defined and often conflicting DOCUPAK instructions, which
centered on the RA discussing the benefits of joining the Army National
Guard (and later the Army Reserve) with a civilian who might be interested
in joining the military. In the DOCUPAK literature, such a civilian was
termed as a potential soldier (PS).18 The PS could be any civilian that the
RA might encounter from “within their individual spheres of influence.”19

Memorandum to the Members of the Subcomm. on Fin. and Contracting Oversight] (providing a
background and summarization of the G-RAP program).
15. NGA G-RAP REPORT, supra note 9, at 1.
16. Because Army National Guard Recruiters were paid for recruiting Potential Soldiers, they
were not eligible to be Recruiting Assistants. See Testimony of Philip Crane at 124, Colorado v. Wilson,
No. 14CR327 (C.D. Col. 2015) (explaining Recruiting Assistants were hired and trained by
DOCUPAK).
17. Id. at 123–24.
18. G-RAP FAQ: Overview of the Guard Recruiting Assistance Program, DEFEND OUR
PROTECTORS 1, http://www.defendourprotectors.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/G-RAP_1.
5.pdf [https://perma.cc/8F97-YRZ7].
19. Guard-Recruiting Assistance Program: From Recruiting and Retention Command, GUARDLIFE,
https://www.state.nj.us/militar/publications/guardlife/volume32no1/grap.html [https://perma.cc/
PBB9-NN6U]. As was done in all States, the New Jersey National Guard strongly encouraged its
National Guard personnel to join the G-RAP, placing great emphasis on the “easy money” to be had.
The New Jersey National Guard advertisement stated:
New Jersey Guard Recruiting Assistants can earn additional income assisting the NJARNG
recruiting efforts by identifying well qualified men and women for service. Recruiter Assistants
(RAs) earn $2,000 for each new recruit who enlists and reports for Basic Training. The RA can
also earn $2,000 for a prior service applicant who enlists in the NJARNG. . . . Guardsmen who
apply online at www.guardrecuritingassitant.com become eligible to serve as a part-time Recruiter
Assistant (RA). The RA applicant will be verified and hired by a contractor [DOCUPAK], not
the NJARNG. . . . The triad of the NJARMG recruiter, RA and potential Soldier will then work
closely together to process the potential Soldier and move them towards accession. Upon
enlistment the RA will receive an initial payment of $1,000. A second $1,000 payment will be
given when a non-prior service applicant ships to Basic Training or when a prior service applicant
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The DOCUPAK vision was that a triad, consisting of the RA, the Army
Recruiter (who would actually enlist the PS), and the PS would all interact
together to move the PS to accession into the National Guard.20
Upon making contact with a PS, the RA was instructed to enter basic
information about each PS whom they contacted into the DOCUPAK
online network, including personally identifiable information (PII) such as
name, address, and social security number.21 When the subject PS enlisted,
the RA would receive compensation through DOCUPAK: $1,000 for every
PS who signed an enlistment contract and then an additional $1,000 when
the new enlistee went to basic training.22 Other higher-level bonuses were
offered to RAs for officers who joined the National Guard. DOCUPAK
also benefited financially each time a PS joined. On the DOCUPAK side
of the equation, in addition to “operational” costs associated with the
contract, DOCUPAK received an extra bounty of $325 on each payment to
an RA.23
When asked to describe the fundamental workings of DOCUPAK, Philip
Crane, the company’s former president testified in district court in Adams
County, Colorado that DOCUPAK was a marketing and advertising
company, stating that “[i]n this particular instance, our focus was on
providing services to the United States government Department of Defense
for recruiting and retention purposes.”24 Philip Crane also testified that
DOCUPAK was merely a “force multiplier.”
[DOCUPAK] encouraged members in good standing of the Army National
Guard to go out and to share their story with other individuals who might
have a propensity to also serve in the military . . . the RAs would share their
stories [about the benefits of serving in the Army National Guard] within their

has completed four months of drill. Do the Math: You get $2,000 for every person you recruit
into the New Jersey Army National Guard. Don’t let Guard be New Jersey’s best kept secret.
Id.
20. See G-RAP FAQ, supra note 18, at 1 (providing an overview of the G-RAP program and
how it works).
21. G-RAP Overview, DEFEND OUR PROTECTORS 7, http://www.defendourprotectors.com/
wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Rules_Version1.pdf [https://perma.cc/4LP2-Z6H3].
22. NGA G-RAP REPORT, supra note 9, at 1.
23. Testimony of Philip Crane at 5, Colorado v. Wilson, No. 14CR327 (C.D. Col. 2015).
24. Id. at 105.
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sphere of influence, whether it be a community center, high school, church,
or any other place of worship.25

In short, the military contracted with DOCUPAK to administer recruiting
programs for the “Army, the big Army, and the National Guard,”26 with
essentially zero oversight on how the program actually functioned. Then,
two years after G-RAP began, the Army Reserve launched AR-RAP in 2007,
which was also administered by DOCUPAK with similar rules for the RA
to recruit a PS.27
G-RAP proved to be extremely successful. By April 2007, the Army
National Guard achieved the congressionally-authorized strength number
of 350,000 troops.28 Nevertheless, the two recruiting programs continued
to operate under DOCUPAK even though no actual need was
demonstrated for them to continue.29 Before the two recruiting programs
were unceremoniously shut down in 2012, approximately 150,000 recruits,
Army-wide, joined either the National Guard or the Army Reserve resulting
in payments of over $300 million.30
Given the extremely minimalist rules regarding how an RA would work
in order to receive payment under G-RAP and AR-RAP,31 it was not
surprising that certain unscrupulous individuals engaged in fraudulent
activities to get DOCUPAK to pay out money that was not earned. In 2007,
the same year the Army reached its National Guard troop level, the Army’s
CID investigated several cases of alleged abuse. Two scenarios of fraud
were uncovered. First, there were instances where some RAs were
suspected of sharing their payment money with Army National Guard
Recruiters who had improperly fed the name of a particular PS to an RA
with the premeditated agreement to split the money that the RA received
for entering the PS in the DOCUPAK system for payment. Since it was
illegal for an Army Recruiter to accept money apart from their fixed Army
25. Id. at 6, 9.
26. Id. at 5.
27. William Nutter, Recruiting Assistants, New Programs, Help Boost Army Reserve Numbers,
U.S. ARMY (Aug. 1, 2007), https://www.army.mil/article/4237/recruiting_assistants_new_programs_
help_boost_army_reserve_numbers [https://perma.cc/5JSJ-ESAQ].
28. NGA G-RAP REPORT, supra note 9, at 1.
29. In fact, the National Guard Bureau overpaid DOCUPAK by $9.2 million. Testimony of
Philip Crane at 106, Wilson, No. 14CR327 (C.D. Col. 2015).
30. Memorandum to the Members of the Subcomm. on Fin. and Contracting Oversight, supra
note 14, at 2; Scarborough, supra note 8.
31. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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salary for recruiting enlistees, this constituted a prima facie case of fraud
under federal criminal statutes. Second, an RA would simply input for
payment from DOCUPAK the name of a PS that they had never met, which
was sometimes accomplished by hacking into the computer system.
Perhaps the biggest ring of abuse was uncovered in San Antonio, Texas,
where a group of individuals had managed to rake in as much as $244,000
from DOCUPAK.32 The reports of fraud led to the erroneous belief of a
systemic nationwide scandal in G-RAP and AR-RAP.33
The death blow to DOCUPAK and the G-RAP and AR-RAP came in
the wake of an Army Audit Agency program-wide audit completed in
2011.34 By the beginning of March 2012, the findings of this investigation35
gained intense publicity due to the media’s “sensational headlines based on
half-truths, innuendo, and anonymous government leaks.”36 For example,
the Washington Post reported on March 13, 2012, that $92 million in bonuses
were allegedly paid to Army Recruiters who were not eligible for the
payments, and that more than a quarter of the $339 million in bonuses
given over the past six years may have been fraudulent.37 In turn, an Army
Inspector General Report from 2014 cited eight general officers and senior
civilian officials for suspected wrongdoing, echoing the earlier Army Audit
Agency findings that the entire DOCUPAK government contract itself was
illegally established in allowing a private civilian company to disburse cash

32. NGA G-RAP REPORT, supra note 9, at 6.
33. Memorandum to the Members of the Subcomm. on Fin. and Contracting Oversight, supra
note 14, at 2; Scarborough, supra note 8.
34. Memorandum to the Members of the Subcomm. on Fin. and Contracting Oversight, supra
note 14, at 2; Scarborough, supra note 8.
35. See NGA G-RAP REPORT, supra note 9, at 1 (noting the Department of Defense and the
Army Audit Agency has conducted at least five separate audits of G-RAP with “five additional
investigations and reviews by the Army, all under a Recruiting Assistance Program Task Force” set up
by the Secretary of the Army).
36. Id.; see Robert O’Harrow Jr., Fraud Investigation Targets Recruiting Program for Army National Guard,
Reserves, WASH. POST (Mar. 13, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/fraudinvestigation-targets-recruiting-program-for-army-national-guard/reserves/2012/03/12/gIQAp1QXAS
_story.html?utm_term=.a0a0dd4ca5e0 [https://perma.cc/3CEZ-3PNZ] (discussing the shocking
allegation of wide-ranging fraud in the Army National Guard’s recruitment program that is the subject
of a Pentagon fraud investigation); Army Cancels Recruitment Program After Allegations of Bonus
Payout Fraud, FOX NEWS (Mar. 14, 2012), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/army-cancelsrecruitment-program-after-allegations-of-bonus-payout-fraud [https://perma.cc/52L6-ARKB] (reporting
1,700 service members could be implicated in the recruiting scandal totaling over 92 million dollars in
fraudulent bonuses).
37. O’Harrow Jr., supra note 36.
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payments to military personnel designated as RAs.38 While the innocent
low-level RAs who worked for DOCUPAK as instructed had no part in
setting up G-RAP, they immediately became tainted.
As stated, the independent inquiries rapidly brought about the
termination of G-RAP and AR-RAP in January 2012.39 However, while calls
for accountability intensified—causing congressional interest—the DOD tasked the
CID with undergoing a massive crusade to investigate any RA involved with G-RAP.
Someone had to pay. Often described as “witch hunts,” the CID ruthlessly
targeted hundreds upon hundreds of innocent rank-and-file RAs who had,
under the parameters of the DOCUPAK contract, simply followed the
actual G-RAP and AR-RAP rules to receive payment for their work.40
Guilty of only complying with the highly dubious and often contradictory
mandates set out by DOCUPAK in the G-RAP rules, very few of the RAs
were able to afford experienced civilian lawyers to defend themselves from
baseless allegations of criminality, particularly if they were facing criminal
charges in federal district courts.
Ironically, while the 2011 Army audit detailed profound deficiencies at
DOCUPAK to include the very premise upon which the program was
constructed, blame was shifted to the low-level RAs who bore the brunt of
the ensuing CID onslaught. Code-named “Task Force Raptor,” over
two hundred CID investigators set out to determine whether over
100,000 RAs had committed crimes.41 According to one watchdog group,
“[R]ather than accept responsibility for ineffective command and for
mismanagement of a contract worth a half a billion dollars, military brass

38. Rowan Scarborough, Army Top Brass Skirt Punishment in Fraud Probe as Lower Ranks Take
Blame, WASH. POST (Mar. 13, 2016), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/mar/13/armytop-brass-skirt-punishment-in-fraud-probe-as-/ [https://perma.cc/GH4G-X5ER].
39. Memorandum to the Members of the Subcomm. on Fin. and Contracting Oversight, supra
note 14, at 2.
40. See generally Darron Smith & Liz Ullman, The Silent Campaign by the US Government to Brand
American Soldiers as Criminals, HUFF. POST (Jun. 05, 2015, 5:20 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/
entry/the-silent-campaign-by-th_b_7521228 [https://perma.cc/A4B2-A5JK] (“But the federal
government has not been satisfied with that level of justice; they intend to extract its ‘pound of flesh’
from this failed incentive program, and they intend to do so by waging silent war against innocent and
vulnerable soldiers who tried in earnest to follow the rules as best they knew how.”).
41. Dave Philipps, Army Fraud Crackdown Uses Broad Net to Catch Small Fish, Some Unfairly,
N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/28/us/national-guard-army-fraudcrackdown.html [https://perma.cc/J4S2-QE99].
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redirected this uncomfortable inquiry to the rank-in-file soldiers [who
served as RAs] . . . .”42
B. Task Force Raptor
While there is no question that Task Force Raptor constituted the largest
and most expensive CID investigation in the history of the Army (estimates
of between 30 to 60 million dollars spent),43 it soon became apparent to
many that the investigation and the investigatory techniques employed by
the CID were rampant with shocking levels of abuse, incompetence, and
mismanagement.
Shockingly, in every Report of Investigation (ROI) that targeted a
“suspect,” the particular CID agent would not list the specific G-RAP or ARRAP rule which an alleged RA wrongdoer had allegedly violated. Instead,
criminal allegations were set out as violations of various Title 18 United
States Code offenses such as “wire fraud”44 (for receiving payment from
DOCUPAK without performing the required work) or “aggravated identity
theft”45 (for improperly obtaining PII from a PS). Amazingly, no one
seemed to notice that if the RA followed the published G-RAP rules, they
were not committing fraud! Clearly, no G-RAP rule violations were cited in
the ROIs simply because it was far easier to allege “fraud” as a general
principle than to tie wrongdoing to a specific G-RAP rule.
At the end of the day, the red thread throughout all the ROIs reflected
the unwritten perception that it was preposterous for an RA to claim
substantial monetary rewards from DOCUPAK for simply engaging a PS in
as little as a one-time conversation about the benefits of joining the Army
National Guard or the Army Reserve. However, as the former president of
DOCUPAK testified, a single conversation of unspecified length about the
benefits of joining the Army National Guard (or Army Reserve) with a PS
was all the RA was required to accomplish according to the G-RAP rules

42. Rowan Scarborough, Army Brass Avoid Rap in Recruitment Fraud Probe: Lower Ranks Take Brunt
of Blame, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2016, at A6; Smith & Ullman, supra note 40.
43. See Phillips, supra note 41 (stating Task Force Raptor “has grown into one of the largest
criminal investigations ever conducted in the military”).
44. Rowan Scarborough, Army National Guard Recruitment Fraud Case Rests on Murky Rules, WASH.
TIMES (May 22, 2017), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/may/22/army-nationalguard-recruitment-fraud-case-rests-o/ [https://perma.cc/UA7Q-VCH3].
45. Id.
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before submitting the name for a future lawful payment should that PS
eventually enlist.46
Of course, one of the largest inhibitors to investigating any given case of
alleged G-RAP abuse was the duration of time from when an alleged
incident occurred, in some instances, nine to ten years had elapsed from the
time when the RA had made contact with a PS. This directly impacted the
ability of witnesses to recall and relate events as well as the CID’s ability to
obtain reliable information. Indeed, it would be rather unreasonable to
expect any given PS to recall a conversation with an RA that took place years
ago—some even ten years on.
C. The Case of Major John Suprynowicz
One case that warranted two front-page national headlines from the
Washington Times perfectly illustrates the almost unbelievable multi-year
nightmare visited on a completely innocent RA caught up in the CID witch
hunt. A highly-decorated combat veteran of Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq,
then-Captain John Suprynowicz worked on the side as an RA in the G-RAP
from 2006 to 2011.47 At the urging of his superiors to participate in the GRAP in order to assist in filling the ranks of the National Guard,
Suprynowicz took the short online DOCUPAK course and was immediately
qualified as a DOCUPAK RA. Over the course of a five-year period, the
former Army sniper worked diligently in accordance with the G-RAP rules
to reach out to numerous PSs, earning what amounted to about $17,000 per
year for his efforts.
Then in 2013, while assigned to U.S. Army North in San Antonio, Texas,
Department of Justice (DOJ) and CID agents confronted
Major Suprynowicz at his workplace, ensuring that the Chief of Staff (COS)
at U.S. Army North and all in his chain of command were aware that
Major Suprynowicz was going to be “arrested” for committing fraud in the
G-RAP. Although Major Suprynowicz stressed that he had done nothing
illegal in G-RAP, DOJ and CID agents confronted him and encouraged him
to “confess to his crimes” in order to avoid going to jail. No arrest was

46. Testimony of Philip Crane at 111–12, Colorado v. Wilson, No. 14CR327 (C.D. Col. 2015).
47. Gen. Officer Memorandum of Reprimand from Major Gen. Clarence Chinn to Major John
W. Suprynowicz (Aug. 31, 2016) (on file with the Warrior Defense Project, St. Mary’s University School
of Law, San Antonio, Texas); but see Scarborough, supra note 8 (“In 2006, [Major Suprynowicz] received
$4,000. The next year, $49,000. By 2010, his last year as an RA, he had collected $85,000 for 41 recruits,
making him one of the highest-paid RAs in the program’s short history.”).
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made, and Major Suprynowicz along with his chain of command assumed
that the matter was closed.
A year later, with a new COS and chain of command at U.S. Army North
in place, DOJ/CID sent Major Suprynowicz a “Target Letter” threatening
prosecution in a federal district court. Facing threats of federal prison,
Major Suprynowicz hired a civilian attorney and paid a hefty “retainer” fee.
Still, no action was taken against him throughout all of 2014 and the first
eleven months of 2015.
By 2015, the federal statute of limitations for his involvement in the GRAP had tolled, and Major Suprynowicz had changed commands to U.S.
Army South, also located in San Antonio, Texas. Reflecting his sterling
work ethic and abilities, in December 2015, Major Suprynowicz was
selected below the zone for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.
Family and friends celebrated this positive accomplishment, not realizing
that the CID nightmare would soon return.
In January 2016, while serving as the senior Action Officer (AO) lead for
the Central American (CENTAM) Regional Leaders Conference (RLC) and
the Army National Guard Adjutant Generals (TAG) conference,
Major Suprynowicz’s top-secret security clearance was abruptly pulled. He
was assigned to a desk job, notified that his promotion to
Lieutenant Colonel was in abeyance, and denied any opportunity to
compete for Battalion Command slots as a career advancement. After
three years of “investigating,” the CID had produced an ROI against him.
The guilty until innocent onslaught had spun into full gear.
Major Suprynowicz sought legal representation from the pro bono legal
assistance mission at St. Mary’s University School of Law, in San Antonio,
Texas. Now known as the Warrior Defense Project (WDP), the center’s
Director, Professor of Law Jeffery Addicott, had served on active duty for
twenty years as an Army Judge Advocate. The WDP agreed to represent
Major Suprynowicz.
After meeting face-to-face with a team of CID and FBI agents and
chastising them for producing the absurdly phony ROI, it was quickly
apparent that no criminal charges would be levied against
Major Suprynowicz by the DOJ or under the Uniformed Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ). This left only the possibility of military administrative
punishment such as a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand
(GOMR), which can nevertheless easily end a soldier’s career and lead to an
involuntary release from the National Guard. Indeed, on June 28, 2016,
Major Suprynowicz was issued a formal GOMR by his commanding
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general, Major General Clarence Chinn, Commander, U.S. Army South.48
This GOMR was accompanied by a two-inch thick CID ROI alleging that
“probable cause exists to believe [Major] Suprynowicz committed the
offenses of Wire Fraud and Aggravated Identify Theft”49 by submitting
names of PSs for payment that he had never met. Amazingly, the ROI did
not contain a single “sworn statement” from a single witness or PS
implicating Major Suprynowicz in any wrongdoing, only the typed-up notes
of CID agents reflecting telephone conversations they had engaged in with
certain individuals who were cited in the CID notes as not knowing thenCaptain Suprynowicz, even though DOCUPAK records showed that
Suprynowicz had submitted the names of these individuals for payment
after talking to them about joining the National Guard.
While the CID ROI took almost three years to complete,
Major Suprynowicz was given only forty-five days to gather evidence and
rebut the GOMR. During that brief time frame, the WDP was able to track
down, interview, and then obtain five sworn written affidavits from former
PSs regarding the key and bottom-line element of the alleged misconduct
cited in the GOMR—that these individuals did not know, or had never met,
or talked to Suprynowicz about entering military service. All individuals
swore that the CID notes were grossly inaccurate and that to the contrary
of what the ROI purported, that they knew then-Captain Suprynowicz in
the context of joining the National Guard. Indeed, given more time, each
and every one of the so-called witnesses cited in the CID ROI would
provide a contradictory statement as to what the CID telephone interviewer
recorded in the CID ROI. In addition, all former PSs said that the CID
interviewer never read back their statement over the phone for them to
confirm and validate as an accurate rendition of their words. It was blatantly
obvious that the CID telephone interviews grossly twisted and recklessly
misrepresented the facts.
On the one hand, Major General Chinn possessed a CID ROI that clearly
indicated, by means of telephone interviews, that certain PSs did not know
then-Captain Suprynowicz. Yet, the sworn statements obtained by the
defense showed that not only did they know Suprynowicz, but in many
instances knew him very well. Something was seriously amiss.
48. Gen. Officer Memorandum of Reprimand from Major Gen. Clarence Chinn to Major John
Suprynowicz (June 28, 2016) (on file with the Warrior Defense Project, St. Mary’s University School
of Law, San Antonio, Texas).
49. Id.
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Faced with a clear contradiction between the CID ROI and the defense’s
evidence, Major General Chinn rescinded the GOMR,50 and ordered an
independent officer (IO) to conduct a “Commanders Inquiry (CI),” and to
base the inquiry on actual sworn testimony from witnesses, something the
CID ROI had not done. It quickly became apparent that of the
eighteen witnesses interviewed by the IO, all had some degree of
recollection of then-Captain Suprynowicz in the context of their decision to
join the Army National Guard. However, some of the former PSs could
not recall giving Captain Suprynowicz their PII.
Major General Chinn elected to issue a second GOMR on August 31,
2016, with new allegations that while Major Suprynowicz had met with all
the individuals he had submitted to DOCUPAK for payment, he had in
some instances improperly obtained PII from some of the PSs. This second
GOMR was also vigorously contested by the WDP in subsequent lengthy
and extensive rebuttal legal memorandums.51 In many ways, the second
GOMR was far more insidious than the first GOMR since it was entirely
based on ex post facto considerations having absolutely nothing to do with
the actual G-RAP rules pertaining to the acquisition or use of PII.
The second GOMR alleged two specific acts of misconduct on the part
of Major Suprynowicz, to wit:
•

An investigation [The Commander’s Inquiry – Memorandum of
Findings dated 26 August 2016] reveals that many individuals
[Potential Soldiers] you claimed under G-RAP did not provide you
with their PII” and

•

Others [Potential Soldiers] did not consent to you using their PII
for the purposes of G-RAP.52

Of course, the key to determining whether or not thenCaptain Suprynowicz violated the two areas of concern specifically cited in
50. Withdrawal of Gen. Officer Memorandum of Reprimand from Major Gen. Clarence Chinn
(Aug. 31, 2016) (on file with the Warrior Defense Project, St. Mary’s University School of Law, San
Antonio, Texas).
51. See Memorandum to Major Gen. Clarence Chinn (Sept. 27, 2016) (on file with the Warrior
Defense Project, St. Mary’s University School of Law, San Antonio, Texas); Memorandum to
Major Gen. Clarence Chinn (Oct. 8, 2016) (on file with the Warrior Defense Project, St. Mary’s
University School of Law, San Antonio, Texas).
52. Gen. Officer Memorandum of Reprimand from Major Gen. Clarence Chinn to Major John
W. Suprynowicz, supra note 47.
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the GOMR, could only be determined in the actual requirements for the RA
under the G-RAP rules at the time of the conduct in question. In other
words, as an RA in the program, what did the G-RAP rules require of
Major Suprynowicz in terms of: (1) obtaining PII from Potential Soldiers;
and (2) obtaining consent from the Potential Soldier for use of that PII in
the G-RAP system?
The first of the two allegations of wrongdoing set out in the second
GOMR was that Suprynowicz did not get the PII directly from each PS he
talked to and, by implication, from no other source. This first allegation of
wrongdoing was in direct conflict with the G-RAP rules instructing the RA
on how he could obtain PII. In short, there was no G-RAP rule at the time
that required Major Suprynowicz to obtain all or even partial PII by or from
the PS. In short, although the G-RAP rules did require that the RA obtain
the necessary PII of the PS in order for DOCUPAK to then enter that PS
into the G-RAP system, it did not require that the RA be provided that
information from the PS. In fact, the G-RAP rules stated the exact opposite
in terms of how the RA could obtain PII regarding a particular PS should
they not be able to get all the PII during their conversation with the PS. The
G-RAP rules in force at the time specifically stated that any missing or
additional PII that the RA might need in order to enter the PS system via
computer could be obtained by the RA from the “local RRNCO.”53
Obviously, Suprynowicz had some bare base level of PII from each and
every PS, i.e., their name and some contact information, or he would not be
engaged in a conversation with the PS. Since all of the witnesses confirmed
that they spoke to then-Captain Suprynowicz, this is simply not an issue.
Again, and most critically important, the G-RAP rules do not require that
all—or even some—of the PII be obtained from the individual PS as alleged
53. G-RAP Overview, supra note 21, at 7. There were multiple versions of the G-RAP rules
during the seven years of its existence. According to Agent Julie Thurlow’s statement, rules version
2.0 would have taken effect in November 2007. Agent’s Investigation Report from Special Agent Julie
Thurlow 1 (Nov. 22, 2013) (on file with the Warrior Defense Project, St. Mary’s University School of
Law, San Antonio, Texas). The biggest change between version 1.5 and 2.0 is handling of PII. See id.
at 4 (noting the update in G-RAP rules “[r]egarding what information the RA needed to get from the
Potential Soldier and from where, the RA’s G-RAP account informed them of the information required
to make a valid nomination[.]”). Additionally, it wasn’t until three years later that the National Guard
Bureau even issued a memo regarding handling of PII through G-RAP. Memorandum from Ronald
S. Walls Explaining Guidelines for Recruiting and Retention Personnel (May 4, 2010) (on file with the
Warrior Defense Project, St. Mary’s University School of Law, San Antonio, Texas). However, neither
DOCUPAK nor the government has ever produced any evidence confirming that these rule changes
were sent to the DOCUPAK RAs. There was also no mechanism to prove that anyone saw the
May 2010 memo regarding PII. Id.
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as the first point of wrongdoing in the GOMR. The G-RAP rules on page 7
clearly state in response to the hypothetical RA’s question about “where do
I [RA] get it [PII from the Potential Soldier]?” that the RA need not get all
the necessary PII to enter into the computer from the PS.54 In short, the
RA is instructed to obtain PII for the PS directly from the “local RRNCO.”
Page 7 states in full:
What information do I [the recruiting assistant] need to get from the
Potential Soldier and where do I get it [PII]?
The online training will inform you of all required information and supporting
documentation to effect enlistment. Your local RRNCO [Army Recruiter]
will provide specifics for each case [the PS]. Legal Name (Birth Certificate);
Address; Social Security Number (SSN Card); Date of Birth (Birth Certificate);
Citizenship (Birth Certificate); Dependency Status (Marriage Certificate); Law
Violations and Physical Status are key elements of the pre-qualification
process.55

The second allegation in the GOMR, that some PSs “did not consent to
you [Suprynowicz] using their PII for the purposes of G-RAP,”56 is also ex
post facto in nature. Again, in hindsight, this would have been an excellent
program metric which one might expect to be found in the G-RAP rules,
but the fact is that it is not found in the G-RAP rules. First, there is no
written consent form for the affirmative release of PII provided in the GRAP rules for the RA to use. Second, no RA is ever instructed in the GRAP rules to create such a consent form. While this would seem like a
reasonable requirement, which could also memorialize the conversations
between the RA and the PS (now in most cases done over ten years ago), it
did not exist in the G-RAP rules and was not required by G-RAP rules.
Third, there is no requirement in the G-RAP rules that the RA specifically
obtain actual verbal or written consent from the PS.
In fact, the only required consent that the RA had to obtain was if the RA
intended to use the PII for any other purpose other than G-RAP. Thus,
since Suprynowicz never used the PII for any other purpose other than
entering the PS into the G-RAP computer system as required, Suprynowicz
was not required to obtain consent. The pertinent language on page 7 of
54. G-RAP Overview, supra note 21, at 7.
55. Id.
56. Gen. Officer Memorandum of Reprimand from Major Gen. Clarence Chinn to Major John
W. Suprynowicz, supra note 47.
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the G-RAP rules clearly states when consent must be obtained, and that
being written consent:
Further release [of PII] without written consent by the Potential Soldier is
strictly prohibited.57

Although the actual requirements of the G-RAP rules absolutely
exonerated Major Suprynowicz from the two statements of alleged
wrongdoing contained in the second GOMR—G-RAP rules did not require
that the RA get the PII from the PS or obtain consent to enter the PII into
the G-RAP—two other questions were also asked in the IO Report. While
the second GOMR did not include these two additional questions as a point
of wrongdoing, the defense also responded to them as they reflected the
confusion of what G-RAP was supposed to do and what it was required to
do. The final two IO questions were:
[D]id MAJ Suprynowicz influence their [the Potential Soldier] decision to join
the National Guard?
[D]id MAJ Suprynowicz mentor the witness [the Potential Soldier] until
he/she shipped to basic training or became fully integrated into his/her
unit.58

The first portion of this analysis once again required reference to the GRAP rules regarding the role of the RA in influencing the PS and then
providing mentorship to the PS. The required G-RAP rules provided
extremely limited guidance for the RA, setting a very low bar of expectation
set out in vague and aspirational language only. The entire G-RAP rules in
this regard are found on pages 7, 10, and 11, respectively.59 Page 7 provides
the following:
What can I say/not say to people about joining the ARNG?
You should start by sharing your personal experiences with the Potential
Soldier as they relate to your knowledge of the ARNG. You will speak from
authority when telling your own story. It is helpful to ask the Potential Soldier
57. G-RAP Overview, supra note 21, at 7.
58. Memorandum of Findings from Colonel Scott P. Nolan, Investigating Officer, to
Colonel James E. Dodson, at 6 (Aug. 26, 2016) [hereinafter Memorandum of Findings] (on file with
the Warrior Defense Project, St. Mary’s University School of Law, San Antonio, Texas).
59. G-RAP Overview, supra note 21, at 7–11.
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probing questions to determine their individual needs, wants and desires. You
should only provide factual information to Potential Soldiers, and tell them
you are unsure if you do not know the answer. The RRNCO should be able
to provide further insight at the meeting engagement. You are not authorized
to make guarantees or promises to a Potential Soldier in regard to any benefits
or incentives. RRNCOs and MEPS Guidance Counselors are the only
authorized personnel to make commitments on behalf of the Guard.60

Page 10 provides the following suggested guidance, employing “should”
instead of “must:”
What should I do with the new recruit while they are at Basic Training
and AIT?
You should support your new Soldier from afar by writing letters, e-mails and
postcards. Additionally, you should engage the new Soldier’s family back
home when appropriate.61

Page 11 provides the following:
At what point do I no longer work with the Potential Soldier?
Your responsibilities end upon receipt of your final $1,000 payment.
However, you are encouraged to maintain a positive relationship with all of
your new Soldiers and to cultivate potential nominees from within their
spheres of influence.62

In light of the G-RAP rules and the gathered witness statements
associated with the case of Major Suprynowicz, the following conclusions
could be reasonably drawn, giving rest to the last two questions in the IO
Report:
(1) Did the IO witnesses confirm knowing Major (P) Suprynowicz?

Yes—18 of 18 witnesses confirm knowing Major (P) Suprynowicz.63

60. Id. at 10.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 11.
63. See Memorandum of Findings, supra note 58, at 5–6 (summarizing the findings of the
eighteen witnesses that met with Major Suprynowicz).
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(2) Did the IO witnesses confirm discussing the military as a Potential Soldier
with Major Suprynowicz?

Yes—18 of 18 witnesses confirm discussing the military with Major (P)
Suprynowicz to some degree.64
(3) Did Major Suprynowicz “influence their decision to join the National
Guard?”

Not relevant—there is nothing in the G-RAP rules that required
Suprynowicz to be the sole source of influence for the PS’s decision to join
the National Guard as question 3 of the IO Report erroneously asked. The
G-RAP rules put no quantitative measure on how much or how long the
RA conversations had to be. The degree of influence that Major
Suprynowicz had on any given PS is not a metric of the G-RAP—the GRAP rules do not require this measure of achievement. In turn, neither
Major Suprynowicz nor any RA is expected to be a “mind reader” to
determine the exact impact of his discussions with the PS’s decision to join
the Army National Guard. Indeed, viewing the matter the other way, not
one of the PSs informed Major Suprynowicz verbally or in writing that they
had already made up their mind to join the military and that his
conversations with them had no impact on them. This subjective attitude
may or may not have been in their minds at the time of their conversations
with Major Suprynowicz, but it is irrelevant. Per G-RAP Basic Instructions
document page 5, “[a]nyone in your ‘[s]phere of [i]nfluence’ expressing an
interest in the ARNG with whom you have a personal relationship” can be
nominated.65
Still, in the majority of cases, then-Captain Suprynowicz went far beyond
the guidance of the G-RAP rules and normal expectations to mentor the
vast majority of the PSs he worked with. In fact, the IO generally
characterized Suprynowicz in this process as: “inspirational leader,” and
“influential.”66
Finally, the implication that because Major Suprynowicz applied to
DOCUPAK for money he earned under the provisions of G-RAP he was
64. See id. at 2–4 (summarizing each witnesses interaction with Major Suprynowicz).
65. Guard Recruiting Assistance Program PowerPoint, DEFEND OUR PROTECTORS,
http://www.defendourprotectors.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/GRAP-PPT.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A45U-4DPG].
66. Memorandum of Findings, supra note 58, at 6.
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somehow required to inform the PS of this fact is fallacious. Under the GRAP rules, no RA was required to inform any of the PSs that their individual
efforts under G-RAP might be monetarily rewarded.
At the end of the day, when faced with the facts of the G-RAP rules, the
real issue for gauging wrongdoing for any given RA is whether the RA met
with the PS. Indeed, there is no doubt that some RAs were guilty of
wrongdoing and criminality because they never met with the PS at all and
yet entered that PS’s name into the DOCUPAK system, usually in a kickback scheme to split the money with a recruiter. This scenario of
wrongdoing and criminality never applied to Suprynowicz. Ironically, the
facts are that Suprynowicz personally knew and met with all of the PSs about
joining the Army National Guard as required by G-RAP rules.
Nevertheless, his reward was to suffer through a four-year slanderous
campaign to destroy his reputation and military career. The truth is that
Major Suprynowicz followed and complied with all the G-RAP rules in
terms of obtaining PII and consent issues when entering that information
into the DOCUPAK system. Any money he obtained was lawfully worked
for and earned in accordance with the provisions of the G-RAP rules.
Major General Chinn considered the legal and rational arguments in the
defense rebuttal and immediately rescinded the second GOMR.67
Furthermore, Major General Chinn specifically found Major Suprynowicz
innocent of any wrongdoing and ordered that the military “flag,” which put
all favorable action in abeyance, be lifted immediately.68 By this time, it was
evident to any reasonable mind that the initial CID ROI investigation, which
had lasted three years, was an affront to basic values of due process and
fairness. While all CID investigations carry the usual weight of stress and
uncertainty to the accused, taking three years to investigate what should
have taken three months (at most) is unfathomable. It leads to the obvious
conclusion that something within the CID system is seriously amiss.
Considering the high-profile fiasco of G-RAP, which touched the highest
levels of the Army command structure, the answer must certainly rest, in
part, to a relentless pressure on Army CID to get results—regardless of the
67. See Filing Determination on General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand from
Major Gen. Clarence Chinn for Major John Suprynowicz (Nov. 23, 2016) (on file with the Warrior
Defense Project, St. Mary’s University School of Law, San Antonio, Texas) (directing the reprimand
be withdrawn and destroyed).
68. Memorandum from Major Gen. Clarence Chinn withdrawing Gen. Officer Memorandum
of Reprimand of Major Suprynowicz (Jul. 5, 2017) [hereinafter Withdrawal of Second GOMR] (on file
with the Warrior Defense Project, St. Mary’s University School of Law, San Antonio, Texas).
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means or consequences. This extreme zealousness engulfed many
innocents, like Major Suprynowicz.
D. CID’s “Titling” System
In the normal course of events within the Army military justice system,
once a suspected crime has occurred, the CID will conduct an investigation
to gather evidence associated with the alleged crime and to identify a
suspect(s) that might have committed the offense(s). This process can
culminate in a written formal ROI. The CID ROI will then go to the
servicing Judge Advocate for a legal opinion to affirm the ROI’s conclusion
that enough evidence has been gathered to conclude that there is probable
cause to believe that a particular suspect has committed a crime. If the Judge
Advocate concurs, then the suspect is automatically “titled” by the CID in
their system of records. In the vast majority of the G-RAP cases, the
servicing Judge Advocate provided great weight to the assertions and
conclusions contained in the ROI under the assumption that the agents
performed their investigative jobs in accordance with law and policy.
Further, the ROI is taken at face value as the legal office does not have the
assets to “double check the math” for accuracy of what is in the CID ROI.
In short, once a suspect is “titled,” he remains in the CID system—which
is freely accessed by fellow agencies in and out of the military—regardless
of if that individual is later fully exonerated by proper judicial or
administrative bodies.
Accordingly, going back to the illustration from the case of
Major Suprynowicz, even though his command rejected the CID ROI and
exonerated him, his struggle for justice was far from over. Due to the CID’s
practice of storing in a system of records all those individuals that are
“titled” in a CID ROI,69 Major Suprynowicz was notified that his
promotion to Lieutenant Colonel announced in 2016 could not go forward,
regardless of the findings of innocence by his commander,
Major General Chinn.70 Because Major Suprynowicz remained in the CID
title system, his case must now be referred to a Promotion Review Board
(PRB) and he would have to submit rebuttal materials all over again to prove
his innocence. The PRB would consider the defense rebuttal written
69. See Patricia A. Ham, The CID Titling Process—Founded or Unfounded, 1998 ARMY L. 1, 1 (1998)
(“Titling is the decision to place the name of a person or other entity in the ‘subject’ block of a CID
report of investigation.”).
70. Withdrawal of Second GOMR, supra note 68.

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol51/iss3/1

22

Addicott: The Army’s G-RAP Fiasco

2020]

THE ARMY’S G-RAP FIASCO

571

materials and the unfavorable CID ROI and, in turn, make a
recommendation to the Secretary of the Army for a final decision. The
WDP assisted Major Suprynowicz in this process as well. It then took
another year to play out before the Secretary of the Army, Mark T. Esper,
issued a favorable memorandum on October 29, 2018 stating, “Effective
immediately, I retain Major John W. Suprynowicz on the FY17
LTC . . . recommended promotion list, pursuant to Army Regulation 135155, paragraph 4-11.”71
As illustrated by the Suprynowicz case, all those innocents that are
improperly “titled” by the CID face similar hurdles in their subsequent
military career progression ranging from promotions, holding security
clearances, and filling choice job assignments. All while the soldier sits in
limbo for years trying to clear his name. Indeed, negative ramifications
bleed over into the National Guard soldier’s civilian job as well. Examples
of cases handled by the WDP include a Tennessee National Guard military
police soldier who was automatically denied a State license to carry a
concealed weapon72 and a National Guard officer in South Carolina who
was fired from his civilian police officer position solely because his name
popped up on a background check that he was “titled” by the CID.73 Both
of these soldiers have been exonerated by their respective commands of the
CID accusations that they engaged in criminality in G-RAP, but because
they were “titled,” their respective States took adverse action against them.
Although the CID has an administrative procedure for a soldier to request
that he be deleted from the CID “title” system of records, it is an internal
decision made by and within the CID itself and is rarely ever granted. There
is no independent oversight.74 It is truly a case of the fox guarding the
henhouse.

71. See Memorandum for Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1 from Mark T. Esper, Secretary of the
Army (Oct. 29, 2018) (on file with the Warrior Defense Project, St. Mary’s University School of Law,
San Antonio, Texas) (recommending the promotion of Major Suprynowicz). Major Suprynowicz was
actually promoted while assigned at the Pentagon in early 2020.
72. Letter from Lisa Knight, Director of Handgun Program, Dept. of Safety and Homeland
Sec., Tenn., to Kristin Steakley (Apr. 17, 2015) (on file with the Warrior Defense Project, St. Mary’s
University School of Law, San Antonio, Texas).
73. Memorandum from Major Irick A. Geary Jr., Division of Law Enf’t and Safety, Univ. of
S.C., to Benjamin Sternemann (Mar. 28, 2019) (on file with the Warrior Defense Project, St. Mary’s
University School of Law, San Antonio, Texas).
74. Ham, supra note 69, at 15.
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In January 2020, the Director of the newly-formed Congressional Justice
for Warriors Caucus (CJWC)75 requested that the WDP produce a “white
paper” on the matter of the CID title system and how it can act to harm
innocent members of the armed forces who have been exonerated of
wrongdoing. The WDP paper provided was entitled: “The Army’s Criminal
Investigation Command, Criminal Investigation Division (CID) Use of an
Administrative Identification System of Records called ‘Titling’ of
Individuals Suspected of UCMJ Criminal Activity.”76 The WDP paper
urged Congress “[t]o develop a legal/policy methodology to address those
cases where an individual is ‘titled’ by the CID but later found innocent of
the alleged UCMJ violation(s), is expeditiously withdrawn from the CID
‘title’ system of records.”77
III. THE WSLA AND G-RAP
A final point of concern in alleging criminality in the G-RAP and AR-RAP
is the matter of the government’s ability to bypass the statute of limitations.
Since federal law prohibits prosecuting a crime after the tolling of the
associated statute of limitations, criminal investigations are also abated.78 For
fraud, the time limit is five years, which would automatically disqualify the vast
majority of the investigations undertaken by the CID in G-RAP and AR-RAP
cases. As of April 2014, a total of thirty-five individuals were convicted in
federal court, twenty-one of those from Texas.79
With the use of unprecedented numbers of civilian contractors on the
battlefield to support the efforts of the military in the GWOT, Congress
expressed its concern that cases of fraud might go unpunished unless the
statute of limitations was waived. Because the longstanding WSLA80 only
applied to conflicts where Congress had made a formal declaration of war
75. The Congressional Justice for Warriors Caucus (CJWC) is “dedicated to educating Members
of Congress about combat-related incidents where U.S. service members who are fighting for our
freedoms have been unjustly incarcerated under the UCMJ.” Congressional Justice for Warriors Caucus,
https://www.govserv.org/US/Washington-D.C./474951293314603/CongressionalGOVSERV,
Justice-for-Warriors-Caucus [https://perma.cc/8DDT-FZLA].
76. Jeffrey F. Addicott, The Army’s Criminal Investigation Command, Criminal Investigation
Division (CID) Use of an Administrative Identification System of Records Called “Titling” of
Individuals Suspected of UCMJ Criminal Activity (on file with the Warrior Defense Project, St. Mary’s
University School of Law, San Antonio, Texas).
77. Id.
78. Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3287 (1948).
79. NGA G-RAP REPORT, supra note 9, at 4.
80. 18 U.S.C. § 3287.
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under its Article I powers, in 2008 Congress passed the Wartime Enforcement
of Fraud Act (WEFA) which amended the WSLA so that it would now apply
to conflicts where Congress had passed an authorization for use of military
force.81 During the GWOT, Congress passed two such authorizations.
Congress specifically authorized the use of military force by enacting,
respectively, the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF)82
and the 2003 Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq
Resolution (AUMFAI).83 The AUMF limits the authorized use of military
force to “those nations, organizations, or persons [the President] determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks which
occurred on September 11, 2001.”84 The AUMFAI, authorized the
President to:
[U]se the Armed Forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary
and appropriate in order to:
(1) defend the national security of the United States against the continuing
threat posed by Iraq; and
(2) enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding
Iraq.85

For the soldiers who also served as “contractors” in the G-RAP and ARRAP cases, the WEFA raises several critical legal issues pertaining to its
applicability to soldiers who served as contractors and to the issue of the
location of the “battlefield.” In 2019, by a writ of certiorari, the United States
Supreme Court was asked to take up the matter in the case of United States v.
Jucutan.86 In 2015, Jordan M. Jucutan, a member of the Army Reserve in the
Northern Mariana Islands, was charged with AR-RAP related offenses,
which were allegedly committed between 2005 and 2009.87 The charges—

81. S. REP. NO. 110-431, at 1 (2008).
82. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
83. Authorization for Use of Military Force against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107243, 116 Stat. 1498 (2002).
84. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
85. Authorization for Use of Military Force against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107243, 116 Stat. 1498 (2002).
86. United States v. Jucutan, 756 F. App’x 691 (9th Cir. 2018).
87. United States v. Jucutan, No. 1:15-CR-00017, 2016 WL 3063852, at *1 (N. Mar. I. May 26,
2016).
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wire fraud88 and aggravated identity theft89—were brought well past the
five-year statute of limitations for most federal crimes and should have been
barred.90 The government asserted that the five-year statute of limitations
period, as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a), had been suspended by the WSLA.
Jucutan appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss for
prosecution of acts beyond the set statute of limitations and lack of standing
to prosecute due to lack of any alleged criminal acts committed against the
United States of America.91 The district court concluded that the criminal
indictment against Mr. Jucutan was not barred by the generally applicable
five-years statute of limitations period,92 finding that the WSLA tolled
18 U.S.C. § 3282(a), and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial,
by a 2-1 vote.93
Agreeing that both lower courts in Jucutan erred in concluding that the
WSLA applied to the wire fraud and aggravated identity theft charged
against Mr. Jucutan, the WDP filed an amicus brief on behalf of Mr. Jucutan’s
writ of certiorari.94 Unfortunately, even though there existed a split in
decisions about the legality of tolling the statute of limitations in two circuit
courts, the Supreme Court refused to take up the matter, leaving it to Congress
to pass corrective legislation.
A. The History of the WSLA and WEFA
In 1942, during World War II, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed
into law the WSLA, tolling the statute of limitations and providing
prosecutors more time to bring charges “relating to criminal fraud offenses
in the United States”95 by civilian contractors. In 1948, President Harry S.
Truman signed a new law making the WSLA permanent.96 The WSLA,
however, only applied to a formal congressional declaration of war under
Article I.
88. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2017).
89. Id. § 1028A.
90. See id. § 3282(a) (“Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, no person shall be
prosecuted, tried, or punished for any offense, not capital, unless the indictment is found or the
information is instituted within five years next after such offense shall have been committed.”).
91. See Jucutan, 756 F. App’x at 692 (denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Brief for Jordan M. Jucutan as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Jucutan v. United States,
139 S. Ct. 2656 (2019) (No. 18-8956), 2019 WL 2226021.
95. S. REP. NO. 110-431, at 2 (2008).
96. Id.

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol51/iss3/1

26

Addicott: The Army’s G-RAP Fiasco

2020]

THE ARMY’S G-RAP FIASCO

575

As noted, in the GWOT there was no such formal declaration of war by
Congress. The WEFA amended97 the WSLA, so its tolling clause would
apply to a congressional authorization of military force pursuant to the War
Powers Resolution.98 A report from the Committee on the Judiciary,
providing the purpose of the WEFA, specified that the original WSLA was
signed in “[recognition of] the extreme difficulty in tracking down
contracting fraud in the midst of a war . . . .”99 Still, at no point does the
report stipulate a deviation from the original purpose of the WSLA.100 In
summary, the WSLA, as amended, applies to fraud against the United States
in “[relation] to the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan,”101 not to
performing purely support functions which have no direct nexus to combat
activities.
B. Use of Contractors on the Battlefield
The level of civilian contractor activities in concert with Department of
Defense (DOD) missions—encompassing a range of technical, logistical,
maintenance, and security support services—has caused a “substantial shift
in the types of contracts for troop support services.”102 Without the
extensive use of contractors, the American military could not conduct
combat operations, contingency operations, or even peacetime
operations.103
Indeed, given the scope and pace of the modern military, military planners
no longer consider civilian contractors as a luxury or a “nice to have”
addition to the force structure. Because civilian contractors now provide a
wide range of essential support to DOD missions, American military
superiority requires contractor support to maintain military readiness and
97. See id. at 6 (“The [WSLA] . . . would close a loophole in current law and give the government
new power to prosecute contracting fraud in Iraq and Afghanistan.”).
98. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (2017) (outlining the steps Congress must take to authorize the lawful
use of military force by the Executive in a prolonged military engagement lasting more than sixty days).
99. S. REP. NO. 110-431, at 2 (2008).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See VALERIE BAILEY GRASSO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. RL33834, DEFENSE
CONTRACTING IN IRAQ: ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR CONGRESS, at ii (2008) (discussing the various
types of Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contracts that have been awarded); Jeffrey
F. Addicott, Contractors on the “Battlefield:” Providing Adequate Protection, Anti-Terrorism Training, and Personnel
Recovery for Civilian Contractors Accompanying the Military in Combat and Contingency Operations, 28 HOUS. J.
INT’L L. 323, 358 (2006) (“DOD guidance regarding the provision of basic AT training has not kept
up with the volume of contractors pouring into Iraq and other places around the globe.”).
103. See 10 U.S.C. § 101(a)(13) (2017) (defining “contingency operation”).
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operational capabilities.104 As such, civilian contractors are critical to
national security in and out of armed-conflict scenarios. In turn, as
evidenced by the Army’s ill-conceived contract with DOCUPAK, certain
contractors were simultaneously serving as military personnel, albeit
complying with requirements attempting to separate their status as soldiers
and contractors performing work for DOCUPAK.
Because Mr. Jucutan was employed by DOCUPAK as a contractor and
performed his contract requirements under AR-RAP outside of the scope
of any wartime activity, he should not have been subjected to the tolling
provisions of the WSLA. Further, the military provided limited guidance on
how DOCUPAK established and administered the subject contract, making
that relationship beyond the intent of the legislation.
The GWOT is unlikely to end soon. In Boumediene v. Bush,105 the Supreme
Court said the GWOT may not end for “a generation or more.”106 Without
an end to the GWOT, the WSLA has the unintended consequence of
creating a potentially unlimited statute of limitations for contractors. This
means contractors could remain subject to potential liability for criminal
offenses for years, possibly a lifetime. Consequently, the potential for
prolonged liability will prevent otherwise willing contractors from assisting
the military in completing its mission, hindering U.S. military capabilities
and national security.
The repeated position of the Court is that the WSLA “should be ‘narrowly
construed’ and ‘interpreted in favor of repose.’”107 Given that the
government has had more than ten years to indict Mr. Jucutan, a “statute of
limitations reflects a legislative judgment that, after a certain time, no
quantum of evidence is sufficient to convict.”108 According to the
Tenth Circuit, quoting the Supreme Court, the time limit barring a criminal
charge is:
[D]esigned to protect individuals from having to defend themselves against
charges when the basic facts may have become obscured by the passage of
time and to minimize the danger of official punishment because of acts in the
104. JEFFREY F. ADDICOTT, TERRORISM LAW: MATERIALS, CASES, COMMENTS 286 (7th ed.
2014).
105. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
106. Id. at 785.
107. Kellogg Brown v. United States ex rel. Carter, 135 S. Ct. 1970, 1978 (2015) (quoting Bridges
v. United States, 346 U.S. 209, 216 (1953)).
108. United States v. DeLia, 906 F.3d 1212, 1217 (10th Cir. 2018) (quoting Stogner v. California,
539 U.S. 607, 615 (2003)).
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far-distant past. Statutes of limitations also encourage law enforcement to
promptly investigate suspected criminal activity.109

As stated, the original version of the WSLA was enacted “to ensure that
the fog of war does not allow those who defraud the United States from
getting away with it because their actions could not be investigated during
hostilities.”110 Regardless, however, the WSLA “creates an exception to a
longstanding congressional ‘policy of repose’ that is fundamental to our
society and our criminal law.”111 Accordingly, any ambiguity in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3287 should be strictly construed and “interpreted in favor of repose.”112
C. Repose
The Ninth Circuit’s decision to uphold the tolling provisions violates the
Supreme Court’s longstanding principle of repose. Providing an extended—
potentially indefinite—statute of limitations for a criminal offense is contrary
to the Court’s precedent. In Toussie v. United States,113 the Court held:
The purpose of a statute of limitations is to limit exposure to criminal
prosecution to a certain fixed period of time following the occurrence of those
acts the legislature has decided to punish by criminal sanctions. Such a
limitation is designed to protect individuals from having to defend themselves
against charges when the basic facts may have become obscured by the
passage of time and to minimize the danger of official punishment because of
acts in the far-distant past.114

The charged offenses against Mr. Jucutan are precisely of the same kind
Toussie finds problematic. Indeed, if the statute of limitations is to be tolled,
the alleged offenses must be directly related to wartime activities. In turn,
although the WEFA extended the statute of limitations to the overseas
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the WEFA did not broaden WSLA’s scope
beyond the type of charged offenses it would toll during wartime.
Specifically, the report from the Committee on the Judiciary states that the
WSLA “is not intended to apply to . . . military actions not specifically
109.
110.
(2008).
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. (quoting Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 114–15 (1970)).
United States v. Sack, 125 F. Supp. 633 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); S. REP. NO. 110-431, at 3 n.4
DeLia, 906 F.3d at 1217.
Id.
Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112 (1970).
Id. at 114–15.
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authorized by Congress pursuant to the War Powers Resolution.”115 Thus,
the WSLA only applies to fraud against the United States, which is
connected to the specifically authorized use of military force, which must be
directly tied to those activities in the overseas war zones outside of the
continental United States.
Both congressional authorizations of military force limit the use of force
to specific locations for specific purposes—all overseas. Conversely, the
WSLA was “not intended to apply to . . . military actions not specifically
authorized by Congress pursuant to the War Powers Resolution.”116 Thus,
alleged criminal actions by a soldier—engaged as a contractor or not—
committed solely within the confines of the United States without a
connection to the GWOT is most assuredly beyond the reach of the WSLA.
Again, offenses involving fraud under the WSLA are “limited strictly to
offenses in which defrauding or attempting to defraud the United States is
an essential ingredient of the offense charged.”117 Bridges v. United States118
held that the WSLA did not apply to offenses outside defrauding the United
States “in any pecuniary manner or in a manner concerning property.”119
In contrast, the Court has also held that the WSLA applied “to false claims
for wool purchases from a federal agency . . . because defrauding the federal
government was ‘an essential ingredient of the offenses charged.’”120 In
this context, to determine whether WSLA should apply to the criminal
offenses alleged against Mr. Jucutan, a soldier and also a contractor with
DOCUPAK, the court must evaluate the elements of the charged offense
and the nexus to wartime activity.121
D. Military Contractors—What Was the Army Thinking?
Like all other RAs, Mr. Jucutan was employed by DOCUPAK as a
contractor and performed his contract requirements under AR-RAP outside
of the scope of any wartime activity. Further, the military provided limited
guidance on how DOCUPAK established and administered the subject

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
(1953)).
121.

S. REP. NO. 110-431, at 4 (2008).
Id.
DeLia, 906 F.3d at 1217.
Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209 (1953).
Id. at 221.
DeLia, 906 F.3d at 1219 (quoting United States v. Grainger, 346 U.S. 235, 237, 241–45
Id. at 1219–21.
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contract, making that entire relationship and performance of activity beyond
the intent of the WSLA.
Civilian parent-contracting companies function under individualized
contracts either directly with the DOD or with other federal agencies.
Because overseas military operations give rise to their fair share of untoward
activities caused by negligent or intentional acts, including wrongful deaths
and accidents, it is not surprising that during the GWOT parent-contracting
companies have faced a number of civil lawsuits emanating from the acts of
their civilian employees, other contractors, military personnel, and hostnation foreigners.
An often raised “defense” employed by contracting companies in the
litigation process is the political question doctrine, which, if adopted by the
court, serves as a complete jurisdictional bar to the suit.122 Even if the
plaintiff’s lawsuit is appropriate and meritorious as to every other procedural
and substantive matter, the political question doctrine renders the case nonjusticiable. In other words, it cannot be heard.
How to identify a non-justiciable political question is set out in Baker
v. Carr.123 The so-called Baker inquiry lists six separate factors, any one of
which renders the case non-justiciable.124 The six Baker factors are:
[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political
decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.125

The Baker factors are broadly defined and apparently listed in descending
order of importance, with the first and second factors providing the most

122. See Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986) (“The Political
question doctrine excludes from judicial review those controversies which revolve around policy
choices and value determinations constitutionally committed for resolution to the halls of Congress or
the confines of the Executive Branch.”).
123. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
124. Id. at 217.
125. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277–78 (2004) (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217).
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weight.126 Each case mandates “a discriminating analysis of the particular
question posed, in terms of the history of its management.”127 One of the
most critical elements is the amount of command and control that the
military has over the particular contract and contractor. The greater the
level of military command and control, the greater the probability that the
requisite Baker factors will be invoked to bar the civil suit.
For instance, the 2006 case of Smith v. Halliburton Co.128 involved a cause
of action against a civilian contractor who operated a dining facility on
In
Forward Operating Base (FOB) Marez in Mosul, Iraq.129
December 2004, a suicide bomber entered the dining facility, detonated
explosives packed with shrapnel, and murdered twenty-two people.130 The
court applied the Baker factors and determined that the contractor was
operating pursuant to the military’s orders, instructions, regulations, and
protection, and therefore the contractor was under military control, making
the case non-justiciable.131
On the other hand, in McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc.,132 the
Eleventh Circuit upheld a lower court’s denial of a motion to dismiss based
on the political question doctrine.133 Although the civilian contractor
company Presidential Airways (Presidential) was under military contract to
provide transportation support to the DOD in Afghanistan, it could not
satisfy any of the Baker factors in a negligence lawsuit filed by survivors of
a Presidential plane crash, killing all aboard.134 The Eleventh Circuit
dismissed the first Baker factor, finding that while the military was involved
in choosing the starting and ending points of various Presidential flights, the
military’s role in directing the activities was “relatively discrete.”135 Because
the court felt the facts demonstrated minimal military involvement and the
type of claim was squarely in the realm of a negligence claim, the remaining
Baker factors were disposed of in quick step.
126. Id. at 278.
127. McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1365 n.36 (11th Cir. 2007), aff’g
460 F. Supp. 2d 1315 (M.D. Fla. 2006).
128. Smith v. Halliburton Co., No. H-06-0462, 2006 WL 2521326 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 30, 2006).
129. Id. at *1.
130. Id.
131. Id. at *6–7.
132. McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2007), aff’g 460 F. Supp.
2d 1315 (M.D. Fla. 2006).
133. Id. at 1361.
134. Id. at 1337, 1365.
135. Id. at 1361.
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In the case of DOCUPAK, this civilian contracting company operated
outside of any theater of combat and was provided little guidance and
oversight from the military as to how to organize or run the G-RAP and
AR-RAP initiatives. Thus, DOCUPAK would certainly fail to satisfy any of
the Baker factors.136 DOCUPAK and the individual RA “military” contractor
who worked for DOCUPAK were far removed from any real connection to
the GWOT and, by extrapolation, far removed from the letter and spirit of the
WLSA. While it is undeniable that the RA working for DOCUPAK
provided some service to the military in the sphere of reaching certain
enlistment goals, those services were not connected to combat-related
actions on the battlefield or in direct support of wartime activities.
When the Ninth Circuit held that the WSLA applied to the criminal
offenses alleged against Mr. Jucutan it mistakenly applied the WSLA to
criminal
offenses
“committed
in
connection
with
the . . . performance . . . of any contract . . . which is . . . directly connected
with or related to [congressionally] authorized use of the Armed Forces.”137
In fact, the government failed to show that AR-RAP itself is “directly
connected with or related to the authorized use of the Armed Forces.”138
Amazingly, the Ninth Circuit seemed satisfied by the government’s
haphazard reliance on a work statement for AR-RAP to show that the
program was directly connected with or related to the AUMF:
[A]s the Army Reserve (AR) transitions from a stand-by reserve to an
operational reserve there still remains challenges for the Global War on Terror
(GWOT) and for manning the AR. The current strength of the Selected
Reserve (SELRES) is just under 195K; missing end-strength goal by 10K.139

This AR-RAP work statement fails to expand the narrow authorization
of the AUMF and AUMFAI.140 Again, only a congressionally authorized
use of military force activates the WSLA’s suspension of the applicable

136. See United States v. Osborne, 886 F.3d 604, 606 (6th Cir. 2018) (stating DOCUPAK is a
private corporation); Memorandum to the Members of the Subcomm. on Fin. and Contracting
Oversight, supra note 14, at 7 (“The National Guard Bureau also failed to obtain sufficient legal reviews
for any of the G-RAP contracts awarded to Docupak.”).
137. 18 U.S.C. § 3287 (2018).
138. Id.
139. United States v. Jucutan, No. 16-10452, 2018 WL 6445749, at *3 (9th Cir. 2018) (Berzon,
J., dissenting).
140. 18 U.S.C. § 3287 (2017).
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statute of limitations.141 The government has made no effort to show that
the need to recruit more troops for the Army Reserve was “directly
connected with or related to the authorized use” of military force under the
AUMF or AUMFAI.
Additionally, the charged offenses against
142
and aggravated identity theft143—contain no
Mr. Jucutan—wire fraud
element which requires Mr. Jucutan to have defrauded the United States
government.144
Furthermore, as previously delineated, the Supreme Court has applied the
WSLA to toll the limitations period only when the alleged fraud was an
“essential ingredient of the offense charged.”145 Defrauding the U.S.
government is not an essential ingredient of the charged offenses—wire
fraud and aggravated identity theft—because neither offense requires
Mr. Jucutan to have defrauded the U.S. government.146
IV. CONCLUSION
The G-RAP may have increased the ranks of the National Guard at a
time when it was needed, but it left in its wake a legacy of destroyed lives of
many innocent RAs. According to all open-source information, the CID
never accounted for even a fraction of the alleged 92 million dollars in socalled fraud in the recruiter programs.147 Ironically, far more money was
spent “investigating” innocent RAs for the sole purpose of getting
individuals “titled.” Regardless of what the outcome might be as to how the
cases were disposed of, the CID could boast that they had at least discovered
significant numbers of wrongdoers, as evidenced by numerous “successfully
concluded” ROIs. Of course, Task Force Raptor may be over, but the
repercussions associated with being “titled” will continue to haunt the
innocent for years to come—both in the military and civilian world.
It is time that the DOD order a complete and detailed independent review
of all ROIs related to Task Force Raptor. Not only must the DOD take
141. See id. (outlining the requirements for a wartime suspension of limitations).
142. Id. § 1343.
143. Id. § 1028A.
144. See id. § 1343 (showing defrauding the U.S. government is not an element of wire fraud);
id. § 1028A (lacking an element which would require defrauding the government).
145. United States v. DeLia, 906 F.3d 1212, 1217 (10th Cir. 2018) (quoting Bridges v. United
States, 346 U.S. 209, 221 (1953)).
146. See 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2008) (demonstrating no requirement of defrauding the government);
18 U.S.C. § 1028A (2004) (providing no element requiring the government be defrauded).
147. See NGA G-RAP REPORT, supra note 9, at 3 (indicating only $900,000 was accounted for
as fraudulently paid out).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol51/iss3/1

34

Addicott: The Army’s G-RAP Fiasco

2020]

THE ARMY’S G-RAP FIASCO

583

immediate steps to delete all those cases from the CID “title” systems where
the command has found the RA innocent of wrongdoing, but all those CID
investigators that conducted sham “telephone-styled” ROI must be held to
account.
Finally, in light of the Supreme Court’s inaction to deal with the statute
of limitations issue posed by the WSLA, Congress must amend the WEFA
to limit its application to contractors that have a direct nexus to “wartime”
activity.
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